China Views the US Election

By Mel Gurtov
China’s Analytical Challenges
China’s America watchers have the same tough job that faces Donald Trump’s campaign: coming up with a new game plan after Joe Biden passed the torch to Kamala Harris. China’s economic woes, Taiwan’s future, and global competition with the US make the analytical task for China more challenging 
Contrary to what may be the popular belief, Chinese analysts in government think tanks and universities have a variety of views of the US. They aren’t always in lock step, though the top party leaders do set guidelines. As a China specialist, I think I can anticipate the questions these analysts generally are addressing relevant to the US election. What does China most value in a US President? What does China want from the US in coming years? What is China’s long game in relations with the US? And finally, what are the specific issues in those relations that will entangle China and the US?
First, Chinese analysts prefer a predictable and stable US administration. Right now, China’s leaders characterize US-China relations as having ”stabilized” after years of contention over Taiwan, the spy balloon incident, and trade differences. They hope to avoid ideologically-based confrontations, preferring to deal with people experienced on China—known quantities, you might say—who are able to identify areas of cooperation and not just disagreement.
Second, Chinese analysts, loyal to Xi Jinping’s preferences, want a US President and administration that recognizes China’s international status as a great power, prefers competition to containment of China, and refrains from undue interference in what China regards as its internal affairs—human rights, political opposition, high-tech development, and especially Taiwan.
Third, Chinese analysts look at China’s long game in Asia and globally, and ask which kind of US leadership gives Beijing its best chance to accomplish its aims. Both parties believe China is the greatest threat to US national security. Still, which US administration might nevertheless accept China as a competitor for leadership in Asia and elsewhere rather than seek to block it diplomatically, militarily, and commercially?
Fourth, Chinese realists will consider how the next US administration is likely to respond to the currently most difficult international situations that divide the two countries: Russian policy in Ukraine, trade and tariff differences, Taiwan, and competition for influence in diverse places such as the South China Sea, the Middle East, and the West and South Pacific.
Harris vs. Trump
How do the Democratic and Republican candidates probably stack up in Chinese thinking when these four avenues of inquiry are used? Vice President Harris is likely to stick closely to the Biden policy on China: strengthening coalitions in Asia to deter any aggressive Chinese move; limiting high-tech exports to China, as part of a ”de-risking” trade policy; and criticizing China’s repression of human rights. Harris will keep reminding Beijing of the costs to its relations with Europe that arise from China’s ongoing support of Russian military industries in the war on Ukraine. 
But a Harris administration will maintain regular high-level diplomatic engagement with China. Especially with an experienced China hand in Tim Walz—Harris  has never visited China—the Harris administration will be one the Chinese believethey can work with on issues such as visas for Chinese students and researchers, the fentanyl trade, climate change, public health, and military-to-military communication.
The Chinese already know what to expect of another Trump administration. After all, not only did they deal with him for four years; they have also read the Project 2025 playbook. They will have to prepare for a new round of tariff wars, significant decoupling of the two countries’ economies, and sharp limits on Chinese investments in the US. Trump’s advisers on China policy will be dogmatically hostile to China, just like his previous team. Diplomacy with China will be downgraded, and hostile confrontations over Taiwan and in the South China Sea may occur more often despite Trump’s personal reluctance to defend US interests in either locale. (Recall his recent statement that Taiwan will have to pay more for US defense.) 
China is also likely to find a Trump administration uninterested in negotiating over nuclear arms, educational exchanges, or climate change. But Beijing will be happy to hear nothing from Trump about human rights or about China’s support of Russia in the Ukraine war. And it will welcome the sharp limits Trump will place on US aid to Ukraine.
No Easy Call
It might seem that China’s balance sheet slightly favors a Harris presidency. But some Chinese analysts argue that Harris and Trump are equally problematic for China—that tensions with the US will persist no matter who occupies the White House, and that both candidates favor less trade exposure to China. 
Other analysts, however, see Trump’s tariff threats as posing the greater danger for China’s economy. And some Chinese analysts see Trump as the better bet—maybe the admiration of one authoritarian regime for another despite Trump’s self-interested and unpredictable leadership style and his high tariffs. They will also be influenced by Trump’s infatuation with Putin, his reluctance to get the US into confrontations abroad, and his devaluing of US security alliances such as NATO.
Perhaps most important of all, the Chinese may be convinced that another Trump administration will cause major convulsions in US society, undermining the US willingness or ability to compete with or threaten China. So as much as a Harris-Walz administration would promise more reliance on diplomacy in search of common ground, it’s Trump’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities that might best meet Chinese preferences.